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1 Introduction
Over the past thirty years, there has been a decline in aggregate volatil-
ity (McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000, Stock and Watson 2002). At the
same time, there has been a large increase in the volatility of firms
(Comin 2000; Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu 2001; Comin and
Mulani 2003; and Chaney, Gabaix, and Philippon 2002).
Our paper has five parts. We first document the upward trend in
various measures of firm volatility. Second, we present a decomposi-
tion of aggregate volatility between the average volatility of sectors
and the correlation of growth across sectors. This decomposition sug-
gests that the decline in aggregate volatility is mostly due to a decline
in the correlation growth rates across sectors.
Third, we explore whether the firm-level trend toward more vola-
tility and the aggregate trend toward more stability are related, or
whether the two have moved in opposite directions by coincidence.
The two trends appear to be related. We find that TFP growth in
industries where firms have become more volatile tends to be less
correlated with aggregate TFP growth. Across countries, there also
seems to be a negative relationship between aggregate and firm-level
volatility.
Fourth, we explore the potential explanations for the increase in
firm-level volatility. We find support for the idea that firm volatility
has increased because of higher competition in the goods market. We
find that firm volatility increases after deregulation. We also find that
the increase in firm-level volatility is correlated with high research and
development (R&D) activity as well as more access to debt and equity
markets. However, we find no evidence that sectors with more access
to external finance have become less correlated with the rest of the168 Comin and Philippon
economy, while we do find evidence that sectors with larger increases
in R&D investment have become less correlated with the rest of the
economy.
2 The Facts
The decline in aggregate volatility has been documented by McConnell
and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001), and Stock and
Watson (2002). On the other hand, firm-level volatility has increased.
Firm-level volatility can be measured using financial data or real data.
Using financial data for the United States, Comin (2000) and Campbell,
Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) document an increase in the volatility of
idiosyncratic stock returns. Using accounting data, Chaney, Gabaix,
and Philippon (2002) and Comin and Mulani (2003) show an increase
in the idiosyncratic volatility of employment, sales, earnings, and capi-
tal expenditures.
Throughout the paper, we will use aggregate data from the National
Income and Product Accounts and firm-level data from COMPUSTAT
and CRSP. We will also use the sectoral data set developed by Jorgen-
son and Stiroh (from now on, KLEM data).
1
2.1 Volatility: GDP Versus Firm Sales
In this section, we document the increase in firm volatility using real
measures, like sales, employment, or capital expenditures. Our sample
includes all the firms in COMPUSTAT with at least eleven consecutive
observations of the relevant variable. Table 3.1 contains the basic de-
scriptive statistics for our sample.
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of idiosyncratic and aggregate vola-
tility. Aggregate volatility (of) is defined as the standard deviation of
the annual growth rate (yt) of real GDP:
+5 iV2
where yt is the average growth rate between t — 4 and t + 5. For each
firm i, we compute the volatility of the growth rate of sales (yt J as:
1/2
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GDP Versus Individual Firm Sales Volatility: 10-Year Centered Rolling Standard Devia-













Distribution of Firm Volatility: 10-Year Centered Rolling Standard Deviation of Sales
Growth
We then take the median across all firms present in the sample at time t
as our measure of typical firm volatility:
o{ = median; {<7j)f}
Figure 3.1 shows the decline in of and the increase in a{. Note also
the difference of scale between the two measures. Idiosyncratic volatil-
ity is an order of magnitude larger than aggregate volatility.
2 Figure
3.2 shows the evolution of the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribu-
tion of firm volatility. It is clear that the whole distribution has moved
upward and that the increase in volatility is even more pronounced at
the top.
3
Our first task is to show the robustness of these findings. The main
issues are sample selection bias and measurement errors. Sample selec-
tion is an issue because more small firms have entered the COMPU-
STAT database over time. Since small firms tend to be more volatile,
the changing composition could explain the trend. We deal with this
first issue by controlling for size and age, and showing that the in-
crease in firm volatility holds within groups of comparable firms.
Comin and Mulani (2003) also show that the results are robust to the
inclusion of firms' fixed effects.
4
The second issue is whether firm-level results are economically
meaningful. To take an extreme example, suppose that we live in



















—•— Controlling for age and size
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Figure 3.3
Firm. Volatility, Alternative Measures: Ten-Year Centered Rolling Standard Deviation of
Sales Growth
problems, in which boundaries of organizations do not matter. Plants
could move among firms without any real consequences, yet firms
would appear to be volatile. Firms would simply not be the right units
of observation. One could perhaps argue that mergers and acquisitions
(M&As) fall partly into the category of irrelevant ownership changes.
Thus, as a robustness check, we are going to show that our results are
not driven by M&As.
Figure 3.3 shows that the trend increase in firm volatility is not
driven by the entry of young and small firms, or by an upsurge in
M&A activity.
5 Another way to show that our results are economically
meaningful is to show that they relate to results obtained in other data
sets. Guvenen and Philippon (2005) show that firm volatility measured
across industries in COMPUSTAT is a good predictor of both un-
employment risk and wage inequality measured across the same
industries in PSID. Comin, Groshen, and Rabin (2005) relate firm-level
volatility to wage volatility at the occupation level by taking advantage
of a unique data set that contains firm-level and worker-level informa-
tion for a sample of firms in Ohio. They document a positive relation-
ship between firm-level volatility and the volatility and dispersion of
wages at the occupation level. We will not discuss these results further,
but we note that they show that our measures of volatility capture real
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Figure 3.4
Turnover of Industry Leaders: 5-Year Ahead Exit Rate from Top 20% of Industry
2.2 Turnover of Leaders Within Industries
The distribution of firm sizes is famously skewed, and a few firms ac-
count for most of the sales in each industry. Thus, one might argue
that firm volatility is relevant only if it affects the industry leaders. We
define turnover in industry I at time t as the probability of leaving the
top quintile of the industry over a five-year period:
TopTurnu = P(Zit+5 < Z%«*> \ Zit > Z^
m)




 w is the 80th percentile of the distribution of Zn at time t in in-
dustry I(i). This measure is robust to the entry of small firms in the
particular industry. We then define average turnover as the median of
turnover across all industries.
Figure 3.4 shows the increase in turnover among leaders for both
operating income and market value. There are too few firms in the
sample in the 1950s to obtain a reasonable estimate of the probability,
so we also computed the correlation of ranking over time, using all the
firms and not only the top 20 percent. For a particular measure Z, we
define:
RkCorr = CorrieI(rankljt(Zit),rankij(Zit+T))
where ranki^t{Zit) is the rank of firm i in industry I at time t according













—•— Correlations after 5 years
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Figure 3.5
Correlation of Labor Productivity Rankings
Note: Five and ten years ahead correlation of within sector ranking, based on sales per
employee.
the one in figure 3.4 and, for the sake of completeness, we present the
results based on labor productivity rankings.
Figure 3.5 shows the evolution of the ranking correlation of firms,
over five and ten years, based on labor productivity. There has been a
clear decline in the ranking correlations over time. We will return to
the interpretation of these findings when we discuss product market
competition.
2.3 Equity Return Volatility
Real data are probably more directly relevant for macroeconomics.
However, there are at least two good reasons to explore financial data
as well. The first is that financial data will allow us to look at firm vol-
atility before World War II. The second is that financial data can help
us disentangle risk from predictable variations in firm dynamics.
We start by looking at equity returns. Let r!; t; m be the return to share-
holders of firm i in month m of year t, and let r™ be the monthly re-
turn on the Value Weighted Index. All the returns come from CRSP.The Rise in Firm-Level Volatility 175
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The Declining Explanatory Power of CAPM: Mean R
2 from CAPM on Monthly Returns
Note: For each firm/year, the CAPM-beta is estimated using 12 monthly returns.




i, V t,m ' for m = 1,...,12
We therefore allow /3t t to vary (smoothly) over time, as seems plausi-
ble since we use data from 1926 to 2004. We take the median across all
firms /months observations in year t as our measure of idiosyncratic fi-
nancial volatility:
a[
m = median,, m(|e;-,t,m|)
The nice thing about monthly data is that it allows us to construct non-
overlapping annual measures of firm volatility. We define the explana-
tory power of the CAPM model as the share of total firm return
volatility that one can explain with the market return, i.e., the R
2 of the
CAPM regression.
Figure 3.6 shows the historical decline in the explanatory power of
CAPM. CAPM used to explain 40 percent of firm returns before the
1950s, but its explanatory power is now around 10 percent. R
2 is the
ratio of two volatilities, however, and we also want to know what has
happened to the level of idiosyncratic volatility. Figure 3.7 shows a U-
shaped pattern for af
n. Firm volatility was high in the late 1920s, and it176 Comin and Philippon
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Figure 3.7
The Evolution of Idiosyncratic Return Volatility: Median Absolute Deviation of Monthly
Residual Firm Returns
Note: Firm returns are CAPM-adjusted using betas estimated on 12 monthly returns.
increased dramatically during the market crash and the early years of
the great depression. It then declined steadily from the mid-1930s to
the mid-1950s. At that point in time, we can make the link with the
real data presented in the previous section. Since the mid-1950s, both
real and financial volatility have increased steadily, with large spikes
around the first oil shock and the rise and fall of the Internet bubble.
For a discussion of the link between financial and real volatility at the
firm level, see Veronesi and Pastor (2003).
Finally, note that our measure of firm volatility falls from 2001 to
2003. First, many firms have delisted from the stock exchanges, and
delisting is more common for small, risky firms. Second, holding con-
stant the composition of the sample, there has been a decrease in firm
volatility. This is not unprecedented. The same happened in the early
1990s, and we expect firm volatility to start increasing again in the
near future.
2.4 Credit Ratings and Credit Spreads
If firms have really become more risky, then this should also be
reflected in corporate bond spreads and corporate bond ratings. For
the spread, we use Moody's seasoned Aaa corporate bond yield minus
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Figure 3.8
Average Credit Ratings and Credit Spreads
Note: Rating ranges from 2 (AAA) to 20 (CCC). Index adjusted for age, size, and in-
dustry.
mestic issuer credit rating from COMPUSTAT, coded from 2 for AAA
to 27 for D (default). We first regress the rating on firm-level character-
istics (age, assets, sales, SIC code), and we then average the residuals
across firms. Figure 3.8 shows that the Aaa spread over treasury has
increased overtime, and also that the average credit rating of firms in
COMPUSTAT has deteriorated. Both trends suggest an increase in
risk, consistent with the increase in cash flow volatility. For more on
this topic, see Campbell and Taksler (2003).
Historical default rates on corporate bonds have also varied a lot
over time. The average default rate from 1900 to 1943 was 1.7 percent.
It dropped to a mere 0.1 percent from 1945 to 1965 (Sylla 2002). It then
increase again, to 0.64 percent between 1970 and 1985, and to 1.85
percent between 1986 and 2001 (Moody's 2002). These evolutions are
also consistent with the importance of rating agencies. These agencies
played an important role before World War II, became largely irrele-
vant in the 1950s and 1960s, and have regained their previous impor-
tance in the past thirty years (Sylla 2002).
Conclusion 1: Firm-level risk has increased over the past fifty years.
Conclusion 2: Firm-level risk was higher in the 1920s and 1930s than in
the 1950s and 1960s.178 Comin and Philippon
3 Sectoral Evidence
We have established that the aggregate stabilization of the U.S. econ-
omy has coincided with a large increase in firm-level risk. However, in
a statistical sense, this is only one observation. Our goal in this section
is to explore sectoral dynamics and see how they relate to firm volatil-
ity. We are first going to show that the decline in aggregate volatility is
accounted for by a decrease in the comovement of the different sectors
and not by a decrease in the average volatility of each sector. Second,
we are going to show that sectors in which firms have become more
volatile have typically become less correlated with the aggregate. Sec-
toral data comes from Jorgenson and Stiroh's 35 KLEM data set.
6
3.1 Decomposition of Aggregate Volatility
We now perform a decomposition of the aggregate variance of the
growth rate of real value added, TFP, and real value added per worker
into sector variances and correlations. Let ys t be the growth rate of the
particular variable in sector s at time t, and let cos
st
e
c be the share of sales
for sector s in the aggregate sales in the economy. Also, let V([ZT]^4)
denote the variance of {Zf_4,Zf_3,... Z(,.. . Zt+4,Zf+5} for any ge- neric variable Z and Cou([ZT]^4, [YT]|^4) be the covariance between
{Zt_4, Zf_3,... Zf,... Zt+4, Zt+5J and {Yt-4, Yt-3,... Yt,. By definition, the aggregate growth rate is:
Then, using the definition of the variance:
v(w» - ~ E fo-X?-^ E
luT=f-4\ i
 LVr=
For simplicity, suppose that (off = cws
se
c for all the sectors i and all
years t. Then V([yT]^4) can be written as follows:
7
Variance Component Covariance Component
Hence, the variance of the growth rate of aggregate sales is de-
composed into two terms: the first is related to the sector level varianceThe Rise in Firm-Level Volatility 179
of sales (variance component), and the second reflects the covariances
between the growth rates of sales at different sectors (covariance
component).
The first two rows in figure 3.9 show the evolution of the variance
and covariance components of the variance of the growth rate of ag-
gregate value added, aggregate value added per worker, and TFP. The
variance component of all three variables displays a hump-shaped pat-
tern over time, with no obvious decline over our sample period, 1959
to 1996. On the other hand, for all three variables, we can observe that
there has been a decline since the 1970s in the covariance of growth
across sectors. For value added per worker and TFP, there has been an
important decline in the covariance of growth over our sample period,
while for value added growth there has been no trend.
For the three variables, the covariance component is substantially
larger than the variance component. The difference in magnitude
ranges from twice larger (TFP growth) to an order of magnitude larger
(value added growth). As a result, the relevant component for under-
standing the dynamics of aggregate volatility is the covariance of
growth across sectors.
The covariance component is affected by the sectoral variance and by
the correlation of a sector with the others. To increase further our un-
derstanding, we also compute the correlation component. Specifically,
we define first the correlation of each sector with the other sectors:
(3.3)
Then we define aggregate correlation as a weighted average of the sec-
toral correlations:
Corrf =
The third row in figure 3.9 shows a clear decline in aggregate correla-
tion for value added, TFP, and value added per worker growth over
time. Hence, we conclude that, in order to understand the decline in
aggregate volatility, we should try to understand what drives this de-
cline in the correlation between sectors. The results presented in this
section are based on the KLEM sectoral data set. We have obtained
similar results for the decomposition of aggregate volatility using man-
ufacturing data from the BLS.{
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Table 3.2




































Firm volatility measured in COMPUSTAT. Sector correlation measured in Jorgenson's
data set. All regressions include a time trend and sector fixed effects. Newey-West stan-
dard errors in parentheses.
Conclusion 3: The decline in aggregate volatility is mostly due to a decrease
in the correlation of growth rates across sectors. The contribution of average
sector volatility is less important.
3.2 Firm Volatility and Sector Comovements
We now ask if the decline in comovement across sectors is linked to the
increase in volatility within each sector. We start from our measure of
idiosyncratic firm volatility 07^ defined in equation (2). We aggregate




c = meant es((ii,t)
On the other hand, we have the sector-specific correlation measure,
Corr*
ef, defined in equation (3). We run the following regressions:
Table 3.2 shows the results when the dependent variable is the corre-
lation of value added, employment, labor productivity, and TFP. We
estimate a negative y in all specifications, and it is significant for the
last three. Of course since both crs
se(
c and Corrf^ are autocorrelated, we
use Newey-West to assess the significance of /?. As a robustness check,
we estimate the relationship between sectoral correlation and firm vol-
atility, replacing the time trend by sector dummies. In this alternative
specification, we continue to obtain a negative estimate of y that is sta-
tistically significant.
To have a more graphical image of the relationship between firm
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Firm Volatility and Sectoral Correlation, 1978-1991184 Comin and Philippon
change in the correlation of output per worker against the change in
the volatility of firms between 1964 and 1977 and between 1978 and
1991, respectively, for the thirty-five sectors in our sample. In these fig-
ures, there is a clear and significant negative cross-sectional relation-
ship between the change in firm volatility and the change in sectoral
correlation for the two periods that cover the whole time-span of our
sample. In various robustness checks, we have found that the results
for productivity (either value added per worker, or TFP) are robust,
while the results for quantities (either employment or value added)
are not always significant.
Conclusion 4: Comovement has decreased more in sectors where firm vola-
tility has increased more.
4 International Evidence
So far our exploration has been restricted to the United States because
of data availability. Some research, however, has been done on non-
U.S. data. Frazzini and Marsh (2002) do not find the same increase in
firm volatility in the United Kingdom. Thesmar and Thoenig (2004)
show an increase in France, especially for listed firms. Li, Morck,
Yang, and Yeung (2004) show that the CAPM explains a larger part of
firm equity returns in emerging markets than in developed economies.
Adding to this evidence, we explore the evolution of firm-level vola-
tility using a short panel of international firms in the COMPUSTAT
GLOBAL data set. This sample covers publicly traded companies be-
tween 1993 and 2004 in more than eighty countries, representing over
90 percent of the world's market capitalization, including coverage of
over 96 percent of European market capitalization and 88 percent of
Asian market capitalization. Due to the short nature of the panel, we
compute volatility using four-year rolling windows. Specifically, for
every firm in the sample, we compute the standard deviation of the
growth rate of employment on a rolling window of four consecutive
years. Our measure of firm volatility in year t is either the mean or the
median of the standard deviations across all firm in year t. Table 3.3
reports the evolution of these measures of firm volatility. We can ob-
serve a clear increase in both measures of firm-level volatility during
the 1990s. Unfortunately, the panel is too short to see if the upward
trend in firm volatility holds in the postwar period.
The length of the panel limits the time series exploration of firm vol-
atility, but it does not preclude us from investigating the cross-sectionThe Rise in Firm-Level Volatility 185
Table 3.3




































determinants of volatility. In particular, one interesting issue that we
can address is the relationship between income per capita and volatil-
ity. At the aggregate level, figure 3.11a shows a well-known fact from,
for example, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997): namely, that there is a
negative relationship between the volatility and the initial level of in-
come per capita. In this case, the sample contains a cross-section of sev-
enty countries during the 1990s. At the firm level, though, we do not
see any relationship between the firm-level volatility in a country and
income per capita.
8 In particular, figure 3.11b illustrates this lack of as-
sociation between median firm volatility of employment growth and
income per capita in a cross-section of fifty-seven countries. This result
holds whether or not we aggregate firm volatilities at the country level
using the mean or the median.
Finally, we wish to explore the relationship between aggregate and
firm-level volatility in the cross-section of countries. Figure 3.12a plots
the scatter plot for our sample of fifty-eight countries, which includes
both developed and developing economies. It is clear from this figure
that when we look at all the countries in the COMPUSTAT GLOBAL
there is no relationship between aggregate and firm-level volatility.
However, this may be the result of the noisiness of the data for some
low income countries.
To mitigate this problem, we explore the subsample of twenty-eight
OECD economies. Figure 3.12b contains the scatter plot of aggregate
and firm volatility for each of our cross-section of OECD economies
during the 1990s. There we can observe a statistically significant nega-
tive relationship between aggregate and firm volatility. Interestingly,
this negative relationship between aggregate and firm volatility re-
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Firm-Level Volatility in a Cross-Section of Countries
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Aggregate and Firm Volatility: Cross-Section of OECD Countries
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log average size of firms in a country, or the log number of firms in a
country.
We do not want to push too far this relationship between aggregate
and firm volatility in the cross-section of OECD countries, but in any
case, it supports the conclusions we have drawn previously while
exploring the postwar panel of U.S. sectors: namely, that there seems
to exist a negative correlation between the evolution of aggregate and
firm-level volatilities.
Conclusion 5: Aggregate volatility and income per capita are negatively re-
lated across countries.
Conclusion 6: Firm volatility and income per capita are uncorrelated across
countries.
Conclusion 7: Firm and aggregate volatility are negatively related among
OECD countries.
5 Theoretical Discussion
We are now going to discuss a few possible explanations for the facts
that we have uncovered so far. In the last part of the paper, we will try
to test these explanations. On the link between sectoral diversification,
volatility, and growth, see Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), Imbs and
Wacziarg (2004), and Koren and Tenreyro (2004).
The first potential explanation is that aggregate stabilization led to
more risk taking by firms. The cause of the aggregate stabilization
could be luck or better monetary policy. The link with individual risk
taking could be the following. Suppose that reallocation is inefficiently
low in recessions. Then entrepreneurs may be reluctant to start risky
ventures because of the eventuality that they fail at a time where
the economy is in a bust. This applies equally to human capital (un-
employment risk) or physical capital (fire sales). A decline in aggregate
volatility could therefore lead to more individual risk taking.
Other explanations assume that there is a change at the firm level
that drives the increase in firm volatility and leads, directly or indi-
rectly, to a decrease in aggregate volatility. Some of these explanations
start from an increase in competition in the goods market. It is easy to
see how competition can drive up firm-level risk. The explanations dif-
fer in how they link competition to aggregate volatility. One explana-
tion, formalized in Philippon (2003), is that more competition leads
firms to adjust their prices faster, which reduces the impact of aggre-The Rise in Firm-Level Volatility 189
gate demand shocks. While intuitively appealing, the simple sticky
price explanation cannot be complete because it also implies more vol-
atile inflation, which is contrary to the evidence.
9
The third explanation, formalized in Comin and Mulani (2005), is
that more competition leads to a decline in the correlation of sectoral
TFP shocks. To see why this could be the case, suppose that firms de-
cide how much to invest in the development of two kinds of inno-
vations. Idiosyncratic, R&D innovations are patentable and benefit
mostly the innovator. General innovations—such as the mass produc-
tion system and other organizational innovations, improved process
controls, product development, testing practices and preproduction
planning, new personnel, and accounting practices—are hard to patent
and can potentially affect all the firms in the economy. An increase in
R&D leads to market turnover and to a reduction in the value of mar-
ket leaders. Since the marginal value of general innovations is propor-
tional to the value of market leaders, an increase in R&D leads to a
decline in the development of general innovations. As a result, the cor-
relation of TFP growth across sectors declines and so does aggregate
volatility.
Finally, financial innovation could explain our facts. Financial inno-
vation can lead to more risk taking (see Arrow 1971, Obstfeld 1994). Fi-
nancial innovation can also work through the competition channel
since financial development favors entry of new competitors. On the
other hand, financial innovation could prevent credit crunches, make
collateral constraints less binding (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
1996) and lead to lower aggregate volatility.
6 Product Market Competition
We have already shown that turnover at the top of industries has sig-
nificantly increased over time (see figures 3.4 and 3.5). Is competition
behind this evolution?
6.1 Profit Margins
Figure 3.13 shows the evolution of profit margins. The profit margin
for firm i at time t is defined as:
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Profit Margins: Operating Income over Sales
where Oln is operating income and S# is sales. The key question is how to
aggregate profit margins. One way is to take the mean across all firms:
_ nonweighted , \
nlt * = meaniei{nit)
Another way is to take the sales-weighted average, or equivalently:
-weighted / ,/cj ULjt
As figure 3.13 shows, the two measures have had very different evo-
lutions. The stability of the weighted margin means that leaders are as
profitable today as they were fifty years ago. However, firms are less
likely to remain leaders for very long. The decline of the nonweighted
margin is due to the entry of new firms (that often have negative cash
flows) and the downfall of previous leaders.
Conclusion 8: Aggregate margins have remained stable because, condi-
tional on being an industry leader, the margins of today are just as high as
the margins of yesterday. The key evolution is that firms are less likely to re-
main leaders now than they were fifty years ago.
6.2 Evidence from Deregulation
The results presented in this section follow Irvine and Pontiff (2005),






Year Relative to Deregulation
Figure 3.14
Deregulation and Sales Volatility Relative to Nonderegulated Firms
Note: Firm volatility is the standard deviation of sales growth over the past 5 years.
lation. Some industries have been deregulated. For these industries, we
can estimate the volatility of firms before and after deregulation, rela-
tive to firms in industries that do not experience deregulation. This is a
standard difference-in-difference estimation.
For each firm, we define a\ like in equation (2), except that we use
only the past five years of data to make the timing more transparent:
a\ = std.dev{yit)r=t_A t
We are therefore using a purely backward-looking measure of vola-
tility. For each year, we measure the volatility of firm in industry I
against firms in the other industries. The deregulated industries are air-
lines (1978), entertainment (1984), gas (1978), trucking (1980), banking
(1994), railroad (1980), electricity (1978), and telecom (1982). Figure
3.14 shows the evolution of the backward-looking relative volatility
measure around the year where deregulation happens. The increase in
firm volatility is not very large (about 1.5 percent after five years), but
it is statistically significant. In the underlying difference-in-difference
regression, the p-value of the test that volatility at t + 5 is the same as
volatility at t - 1 is 0.0123.
Conclusion 9: Deregulation can account for some of the increase in firm
volatility.192 Comin and Philippon
Table 3.4
R&D and Firm Volatility, Panel Regression, 1956-1997, Thirty-Five Sectors
Dependent Variable
Mean Median
Mean Volatility Median Volatility
Volatility of Sales per Volatility of Sales per















Newey-West Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include a time trend and
sector dummies.
7 R&D, Innovations, and Firm Dynamics
Following the Schumpeterian tradition, Comin and Mulani (2005)
argue that the observed increase in R&D-driven innovations may be
responsible for the increase in the turnover in market leadership
and firm volatility. Consistent, with this idea, Chun, Kim, Lee, and
Morck (2004) find that firm-specific stock return volatility is higher
in industries that invest more in information technology. To ex-
plore this hypothesis, we estimate the following regression in a panel
of thirty-five two-digit sectors in the United States during the period
1950-2003:
0"s,t = as + fit + yRDSJ + eS)t
where ast denotes the measure of firm-level volatility in sector s at time
t, cts is a sector-specific intercept, and RDS)t denotes total R&D expenses
over total sales in sector s during year t.
Table 3.4 reports the estimates of y for various measures of volatility.
In all the cases, there is a positive and statistically significant associa-
tion between R&D and firm volatility. These estimates are robust to
substituting the time trend for time dummies. Further, the estimated
coefficient is economically significant. R&D intensity has increased by
about 2 percent since the mid 1950s. This implies that the increase in
R&D could account for an increase in firm volatility of between 1.5
and 6 percentage points of the total increase of approximately 10 per-
centage points.
Of course, there is a long way between correlation and causation.
Further, the reserve causality argument is particularly plausible in thisThe Rise in Firm-Level Volatility 193
Table 3.5
R&D and Firm Volatility, Cross-Section of Thirty-Five Sectors Before and After 1980
Firm volatility before 1980
R&D/sales before 1980
N



































context: namely, when it is easier to take over market leaders, and
therefore there is more firm volatility, firms have more incentives to in-
vest in R&D to materialize this possibility.
One crude way to check whether R&D has a positive effect on firm
volatility consists of exploring whether the increase in firm volatility
after 1980 has been larger in the sectors that invested more heavily in
R&D before 1980. This is the motivation for the following specification:
<?s,POST — (3.4)
By fixing R&D prior to 1980, we avoid the reverse effect of volatility
on R&D. In this specification, this comes at the cost of reducing the ini-
tial panel to a cross-section of increments in volatility. Table 3.5 reports
the estimates for y in equation (4) for various measures of firm volatil-
ity. For all of them, there is a positive effect of pre-1980 R&D intensity
on post-1980 firm volatility. This effect is statistically significant at con-
ventional levels for the mean of the volatility of sales and sales per
worker and for the median of the volatility of sales. For the median
volatility of sales per worker, the effect of R&D before 1980 on firm vol-
atility after 1980 becomes significant if we restrict to the nonprimary
economy.
To increase our understanding of the interaction between firm vola-
tility and R&D, we proceed to estimate the following equation:
ast = as+j3t + y(j)RDStt-j + est
for values of / between 10 and —10. For concreteness, we focus now on
the median volatility of sales per worker as a measure of ast, though
the results are very robust to the other volatility measures. Figure194 Comin and Philippon
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Figure 3.15a
Effect of R&D at t - / on Firm Volatility at t
3.15a reports the estimate of y for various lags (/), and figure 3.15b
reports the associated p-values (in an inverse scale) after computing
Newey-West standard errors. In these figures, the lead-lag relationship
between R&D and volatility is very clear. As we suspected, current
volatility has a significant impact on future R&D that peaks at approx-
imately t + 3. However, there is a very apparent effect of past R&D on
current volatility that peaks at t — 5. This effect is always positive, sta-
tistically significant, and typically larger than the contemporaneous
correlation between R&D and firm volatility.
Finally, since R&D seems to be an important determinant of firm
volatility, we can explore how R&D affects the comovement of sectoral
growth. To this end, we estimate the following equation:
Corriy = as+pt + yRDSJ + est
where Corr*
ef is defined in expression (3). The estimates of y when
Corr^f is measured by the correlations of productivity and TFP growth
are —3 and —2.4, respectively, with p-values of 2 percent. Hence, the
increase in R&D is associated with a decline of between 5 and 6 per-
centage points in the sectoral correlation of TFP or productivity growth
of the observed decline of between 10 and 25 percentage points. These
estimates are robust to replacing the time trend by time dummies.
Conclusion 10: Increases in R&D intensity are correlated with significant
increases infirm volatility.The Rise in Firm-Level Volatility 195




p-Value of the Effect of R&D at t - j on Firm Volatility at t
Conclusion 11: Growth in sectors with larger increases in R&D spending
has become less synchronized with aggregate growth in the economy.
8 Financial Development
Before the Great Depression, financial markets for high-risk companies
were very active. Corporate defaults were common, and IPOs were nu-
merous (see above for defaults; see Jovanovic and Rousseau [2001] for
IPOs). In the 1950s and 1960s, defaults were extremely rare, and IPOs
almost disappeared. The high-yield market was reinvented in the
1970s, and IPOs reached historical highs in the 1990s. Li, Morck, Yang,
and Yeung (2004) find that firm-specific volatility is linked to the open-
ness of capital markets across emerging countries, but not to openness
to trade. Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) find that, among French firms,
volatility increased more for publicly traded companies following fi-
nancial deregulation.
On the macroeconomic side, there are many models and a lot of evi-
dence to support the idea that financial development can reduce aggre-
gate volatility. Recently, Campello (2003) finds that industry markups
are more countercyclical when leverage ratios are high, and Braun and
Larrain (2004) show that industries that rely more on external finance196 Comin and Philippon
are more sensitive to aggregate shocks and that the effect is stronger in
countries that are less financially developed.
We were not able to find a plausible instrument for financial devel-
opment, so we can only present reduced form regressions. We want to
learn if industries that use a lot of external finance also experience large
increases in firm volatility:




For sector s at time t, EQst is the ratio of total issues of common and
preferred stocks over total sales, and LDst is the ratio of total long-
term debt issues over total sales. As before, erS; t is the median firm vol-
atility, measured between f-4 and t + 5, and RDSyt is total R&D
expenditures over total sales. We obtain the following results for our













Conclusion 12: Increases in firm volatility are associated with significant
increases in R&D intensity and with significant increases in debt and equity
issuances.
We can also look at the link between external finance and sectoral
correlations (using the correlation of the growth rate of TFP in sector s
at time t with the aggregate TFP growth of the economy):
Sjt + y
EQEQSjt + y


















The negative link between TFP comovement and R&D appears robust,
but there is no significant link with external financing.
Conclusion 13: R&D intensity is associated with decreases in comovement,
while external financing is not.The Rise in Firm-Level Volatility 197
9 Conclusion
We document a widespread increase in firm-level volatility, which we
argue is primarily due to more competition in product markets. We
show that competition is best viewed as an increase in the turnover of
market shares, as opposed to the more traditional approach emphasiz-
ing average markups, or indexes of concentration. We find that aver-
age industry profit margins have been roughly stable over the past
fifty years because, at any point in time, industry leaders account for
most of the sales, and the profit margins conditional on being a leader
have not changed much. However, we show that the expected length
of leadership by any particular firm has declined dramatically.
We then explore the possible causes for the increase in competition,
and we find several explanations. First, we show that firm volatility
increases after deregulation. Second, volatility increases more in indus-
tries that experience larger increases in R&D investment and in indus-
tries that issue more debt and equity.
The contrast between the decline in aggregate risk and the increase
in idiosyncratic firm volatility is striking, and we present evidence that
the two trends are related. Stock and Watson (2002) show that most of
the decline in volatility is due to smaller shocks. We bring two new
pieces to the puzzle. First, we show that the decline in the volatility of
aggregate shocks is primarily due to a decrease in the correlation of
shocks across sectors rather than a decline in sectoral volatility. Second,
we show that the correlation of a particular sector with the rest of
the economy declines more when firm volatility within this sector
increases more. Therefore, we claim that there is a negative relationship
between firm and aggregate volatility.
Several theories can help us understand this connection, and we
classify them in two broad categories. The first group takes the aggre-
gate shocks as given and emphasizes a decline in a particular amplifi-
cation mechanism, like the credit multiplier or nominal rigidities. We
do not find supporting evidence for a role of the investment-financial
multiplier in the decline in aggregate volatility. Our data does not
allow us to explore the role of nominal rigidities. The second group of
explanations argues that competition can lead to a reduction in the cor-
relation of TFP shocks across sectors. We find evidence supportive of
this hypothesis: R&D spending at the industry level predicts both an
increase in firm volatility within the industry and a decrease in the
comovement of the industry with the rest of the economy.198 Comin and Philippon
10 Appendix
In this appendix, we derive the decomposition of the variance of aggre-
gate growth into the variance of sectoral growth and the covariance of
growth across sectors. The growth rate of the aggregate variable of in-
terest (yt) is related to sectoral growth (yst) as follows:
where cos
sef
c are the relevant sectoral weights. Aggregate variance of yt
between z — t — 4 and z = t + 5 can the be expressed as:
Imposing the restriction that sectoral weights are constant during the
interval [t - 4, t + 5], we can express aggregate variance as:
Expanding and manipulating, we obtain the variance-covariance
decomposition:
Variance Component Covariance Component
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insightful discussions, and to the participants of the 2005 NBER conference on macroeco-
nomics for their comments.
1. We have checked the robustness of our findings using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
sectoral data.
2. Another way to measure firm volatility is to estimate an autoregressive process and
compute the volatility of the innovations. The increase in volatility is the same if we mea-
sure it in that way.
3. For a decomposition of firm dynamics into permanent and transitory shocks, see
Franco and Philippon (2004).
4. Comin and Mulani (2003) also allow for cohort-specific age and size effects and for
autocorrelated errors.
5. This is not to say that M&As are not important. They do not matter much here be-
cause we use the median to aggregate across firms. If we had used the mean as our
benchmark for figure 3.1, then some large mergers would have affected our measure,
and removing these mergers would have made a difference.
6. All of our results also hold using BLS manufacturing data.
7. See the appendix for the derivation details.
8. This lack of association between firm-level volatility and income per capita persist if
we compute firm volatility after filtering firm growth from shocks to aggregate growth.
Specifically, we regress firm growth on country-time specific dummies and compute the
standard deviation of the residuals to measure firm volatility.
9. This is because the standard sticky price model assumes a constant velocity, hence
y = m — p, and for a given volatility of m, the only way to decrease the volatility of y is
to increase the volatility of p. Sticky price models are one example in the class of models
with countercyclical markups. Models with real countercyclical markups would not
make the counterfactual prediction.
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Introduction
Kim and Nelson (1999), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blan-
chard and Simon (2001), Stock and Watson (2002), and Boivin and
Giannoni (2003), among others, have documented a significant decline
in aggregate volatility in the United States and other OECD economies.
There is no consensus, however, on the causes of this decline, so many
questions regarding its implications and welfare consequences remain
unanswered.
On the basis of the aggregate pattern, it would be natural to conjec-
ture that there must have been a similar decline in volatility at the firm
level. Nevertheless, such a conjecture need not be right. This can be




Xi) + ^ ^ OLiOLj C0V(Xi, Xj) (1)
where, in this context, x = Y^l Ufa is the growth rate of aggregate out-
put, Xi is the growth rate of value added of firm i, and a; is the share of
value added of firm i in aggregate output, with J2f oci — 1. This equa-
tion implies that a decline in the variance of aggregate output x does
not necessarily imply that Var(xi)'s or their (weighted) averages have
declined. Instead, the decline in aggregate variance may result from a
reduction in comovement (a decline in the covariance terms) or from
increased diversification (the economy may have added another firm
or sector, so that n has increased).
Therefore, understanding how firm-level volatility has changed over
the past thirty years would be very informative for understanding why204 Acemoglu
aggregate volatility has declined. Some theories of declining volatility
at the aggregate level, such as those emphasizing the improved con-
duct of monetary policy, would naturally suggest that we should
expect similar changes at the firm level, whereas others, for example,
those emphasizing structural change, could be more consistent with
reductions in comovements across sectors and firms.
A number of recent papers have started investigating changes in
firm-level volatility. Perhaps surprisingly, the picture that emerges is
one of increasing firm-level volatility going hand in hand with declin-
ing aggregate volatility.
The paper by Comin and Philippon surveys some of the recent find-
ings and adds to them. It is clearly written and makes a good case that
firm-level volatility has been increasing. It has convinced me that we
have to take the pattern of increasing firm-level volatility seriously
and understand its theoretical underpinnings.
However, the authors do not develop the theoretical implications of
their findings fully. Although many different theories, some of them
mentioned by the authors, are consistent with certain patterns in the
data, it would be interesting to start from a fully-specified model and
look at the data through the lenses of such a model. What do these pat-
terns mean? Can some of the existing theories do a good job of ac-
counting for the patterns?
I will start with a brief discussion of the empirical patterns presented
by the authors and their robustness, and then work through a simple
model based on my previous work (Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997) to
present a possible interpretation for the findings. This is not meant to
argue that this model is the right explanation, but it is intended to illus-
trate that we need models to interpret these facts. Other models, more
tightly tailored to the questions related to aggregate volatility and the
facts presented here, may do a better job.
Empirical Patterns
Basic Facts
I will start with the facts that appear to me to be more important. These
are:
1. Firm-level volatility has increased steadily over the past fifty years.
2. There is a similar picture emerging from idiosyncratic risk of firm
returns.Comment 205
3. There is now less comovement of different sectors; i.e., covariance
terms in equation (1) above have declined.
4. Aggregate volatility and income per capita are negatively related
across countries.
5. The evidence on the relationship between firm volatility and income
per capita seems to be inconclusive.
I have emphasized the steadiness of the increase in firm-level volatility
since I believe this should be an important ingredient in our thinking.
For similar reasons, I also emphasized the decline in covariance.
Comin and Philippon discuss a number of other facts in their paper.
Since my purpose here is to interpret the patterns related to firm-level
volatility (and its relationship with aggregate volatility) through the
lenses of a simple model, I have chosen to focus on these to start. After
all, theories are useful in part because they guide us in our choice of
which facts to focus on.
Even when we focus on a subset of facts presented in this paper, the
implications are remarkable. If these facts are robust, they are impor-
tant ingredients (and challenges) to theories of aggregate volatility.
Robustness
Are the facts robust? Comin and Philippon provide a number of
robustness checks, and Campbell et al. (2001) provide more robustness
checks on the pattern of equity returns. I am largely convinced by these
patterns and believe that we have to take the increase in firm-level
volatility seriously. Nevertheless, there are two areas in which more
checks would be useful.
1. Are the results an artifact of the sample used by the authors?
Here, the concern is that the sample is that of listed firms, so one
may worry about whether firms that become listed in the recent past
are more risky. The authors show results that control for age and size,
but more can be done here. For example, one should look at how vola-
tility of a cohort of firms changes relative to the changes of a same-age
cohort of firms in the past. This would be similar to the exercises in the
inequality literature (e.g., Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1993), which tried
to control for cohort-specific factors in accounting for the rise in overall
inequality in the United States.
1
Similarly, as an alternative control for sample selection, one should
look at how the results change when the analysis is conducted on the
subset of firms that have been continuously listed since 1960.206 Acemoglu
2. Is there supporting evidence from other sources?
If firm-level volatility is increasing, we should see this in other data
sets as well. For example, there should be more "churning," for exam-
ple, greater expansions and contractions of firms. Is there any evidence
of this?
As a quick check, we can look at the job reallocation data in the man-
ufacturing sector from Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996). These
data give us one measure of volatility at the plant-level for the manu-
facturing sector. Interestingly, they do not show any increase in job
reallocation, so at the very least, one should try to reconcile the in-
crease in the volatility of listed firms in this study with the job realloca-
tion data.
Comin and Philippon's Explanations
Comin and Philippon suggest a number of explanations for this pat-
tern. However, they do not investigate these in detail, and it is not clear
whether they can account for the most salient patterns in the data (and
whether they are theoretically compelling).
Here I briefly discuss their suggested explanations. I place special
emphasis on the fact that a parsimonious theory should account
both for the firm-level and aggregate patterns, and judge the theories
against this benchmark.
Increased Competition
Comin and Philippon provide suggestive evidence that increased
product market competition (perhaps driven by deregulation) may
have contributed to increased firm-level volatility. Most important,
they document that there is more turnover in the ranks of firms (espe-
cially in the positions of market leadership), and there has been greater
increase in volatility in sectors undergoing deregulation.
Though interesting, this evidence is not necessarily conclusive, since
the usual worries associated with any correlation-type evidence apply;
deregulation and its timing could be endogenous, and other factors about
the deregulated industries could be driving the increase in volatility.
My most important problem with this explanation is different, how-
ever. As emphasized above, the increase in firm-level volatility appears
to be a relatively steady phenomenon rather than a trend confined to
the aftermath of deregulation only. It is therefore difficult to imagine
that deregulation itself is at the root of the patterns we observe.Comment 207
Having said that, it would have still been interesting to dig deeper
into explanations related to changes in the level of competition in the
product market. A theory of increased volatility at the firm level due
to deregulation does not necessarily predict a decline in aggregate
volatility. If something else—in particular, the covariances—does not
change, then aggregate volatility will also increase. So why do we
have a decline in aggregate volatility? One avenue investigated by
Phillippon (2003) is the possibility that greater competition leads to
more frequent price adjustments and reduces aggregate volatility via
this channel. Another possibility would be to investigate potential
changes in market structure that can simultaneously account for the
greater turnover in leadership positions and the relative stability of
average industry profit margins. It would be nice to see the authors
investigate this more.
Increased R&D-Based Competition
Another hypothesis that the authors suggest is that increased R&D-
based competition is responsible for increased firm-level volatility.
Their main theoretical idea is this: R&D, especially new product
or technology development, is a risky activity. Therefore, perhaps
increased R&D-based competition will increase firm-level volatility.
Nevertheless, it is unclear why R&D-based competition should reduce
aggregate volatility and also whether greater R&D necessarily means
greater R&D-based competition (as opposed to greater R&D creating a
shield for incumbents and reducing competitive pressures).
Having said that, I again believe that one can develop an interesting
theory where a patent-race (e.g., Harris and Vickers 1987) reduces the
covariance between firms. Another interesting angle might be to con-
sider a shift from imitation-based to innovation-based growth (e.g.,
Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti 2003) and investigate whether such a
shift could have a systematic effect on the relationship between aggre-
gate and firm-level volatility. But the authors do not go down this
route and do not present a worked-out model.
Instead, they provide evidence that increases in R&D intensity at the
sectoral level are correlated with increases in volatility at the firm level.
But it is difficult to know what to do with this evidence. First of all,
omitted characteristics of firms and sectors are potentially correlated
with other determinants of volatility. Second, many other theories,
based on different driving forces, might imply this pattern as a conse-
quence of the change in the level and distribution of sales across firms.208 Acemoglu
The other issue that comes up again is the steady nature of the in-
crease in firm-level volatility. At face value, this story would have a
chance only if the increase in R&D-based competition were a steady
phenomenon, but it is not clear whether or not this is so, and the paper
does not get into these issues.
A Model: Diversification and Financial Development
Comin and Philippon also mention financial development as another
potential explanation but do not make much of it. Perhaps because
I have worked on such models, I believe that general equilibrium
models of financial development, risk-taking, and risk-diversification
provide a particularly useful perspective for thinking about the rela-
tionship between firm-level volatility and aggregate volatility. Both to
highlight the implications of such models and to emphasize the useful-
ness of looking at the facts through the lenses of a theory, I now pres-
ent a bare-bones version of a model based on Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(1997).
Model
Fabrizio Zilibotti and I analyzed a general equilibrium model of risk-
taking and diversification to investigate how aggregate volatility and
productivity change over the process of development and the role of
shocks in takeoff. This model was not designed to think about firm-
level volatility. Here I present a variant of that model with two
differences:
1. Aspects related to capital accumulation are stripped away to sim-
plify the exposition.
2. I pay special attention to firm-level volatility to generate insights
about the facts that are on the table here.
Also, because of space constraints, I will not give all the details and
derivations, which are very similar to those in Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(1997).
There is a continuum of equally likely states represented by the unit
interval. There is also a potential for 1/e of firms (where e —> 0),
depending on resources and available technology. Firm / e [0,1] covers
an interval of length e over the unit interval disjoint from those of other
firms. It has access to the following technology of production:Comment 209
(2)
where R > r, and eF( + (f>
]t is the total amount invested in this firm,
with <j>l invested in safe activities with a rate of return r, and eF(
invested in risky activities with a rate of return R/e. The variable 0( is
defined such that Q\ = 1 if the realization of a uniform random variable
over the unit interval falls in the e interval controlled by this firm. This
implies that Prob[#/ = 1] = e and also that a balanced portfolio of 1/e
firms, each with $\ — 0, will have a rate of return of R for sure. This is
a convenient feature of this specification since the number of firms will
directly correspond to diversification. As e —>• 0, each firm pays out in a
single state and so is similar to a basic Arrow security, and we use j
both to denote the underlying state and the corresponding firm paying
out in that state. Another important feature of equation (2) is that a
greater eFJ relative to </>( implies that the output of the firm will be
more risky (i.e., there will be more risk-taking at the firm level).
On the technology side, there are two types of constraints on the
number of active firms:
1. Minimum size requirements.
2. Available technology.
These constraints are important since otherwise, the economy (and all
consumers) would choose a balanced investment in all firms without
any risks. Limits on the resources available to the representative con-
sumer and technology will prevent this riskless allocation and intro-
duce a trade-off between risk and return. More specifically, minimum
size requirements refer to the fact that risky investment in firm / can-
not be less than a certain amount M(j); i.e., we need F
; > M(j) for
some M(j) > 0. To keep the analysis tractable let us assume:
where firms are ranked in increasing minimum size. This formulation
means that the first y sectors do not have minimum size requirements,
and that minimum size requirements increase linearly. In addition, at
time t the available technology dictates that only firms with / < nt can
be active.210 Acemoglu
Let us also assume that the economy admits a representative con-
sumer with logarithmic preferences and that a total amount of Kt can
be invested at time t. To characterize the equilibrium, we need to be
more specific about the market structure and the concept of equilib-
rium. Let us assume that there is free entry at the beginning of the
period and that a large number of agents without any funds can enter
and operate each potential firm (without any further costs). If they de-
cide to operate a firm, they need to raise all of the investment of the
firm from the consumers by selling claims to their output. Given this,
we define an equilibrium as an allocation such that, given the set of
active firms, prices clear all markets, and the set of active firms is deter-
mined by free entry.
2
To characterize the equilibrium, let Jt be the set of active firms. Given
the set of active firms, the equilibrium is competitive, so it will be a
solution to:






/ = rf </>!dj
Jo
Equation (4) imposes that total investment is equal to total resources,
Kt; equation (5) specifies consumption in state ;' as equal to return on
safe assets and investments in the firm paying out in state ;; and finally
equation (6) imposes that there will be no investment in firms that are
not active.
Two features make the characterization of equilibrium simpler. First,
lower-ranked firms will be active first in equilibrium (since the returns
from all firms are symmetric, but higher-ranked firms are more expen-
sive since they require more resources). Second, the above program
implies equal risky investment for all active firms (again since the
returns from all firms are symmetric).
3 In view of these observations,
we have the following form of the solution; let firms / e [0, nt] be the
set of active firms, then:Comment 211
(7)
(8)
The most important observation here is that F(Kt, nt) is increasing in
nt, while (/>{Kt) is decreasing in nt. This is because as nt increases, there
is greater diversification, so greater investments in risky activities be-
come less costly. The implication is that as nt increases, the average
firm becomes more risky [since their risky investment, F(Kt,nt), in-
creases, and its safe investment, (j){Kt, fit), declines].
How is nt determined in equilibrium? This is where we turn to the
free-entry condition. Suppose that nt < nt. Then as long as one more
firm can enter and make positive profits, there will be entry. Imagine
that equilibrium nt were such that F(Kt,nt) > M(nt), then one more
firm could enter and charge a premium to individuals holding its stock
to make positive profits. Also, F(Kt,nt) < M(nt) could not be an equi-
librium since it would violate feasibility. Therefore, when we are in
the region where nt < fit, equilibrium n*(Kt) must be such that
F(Kt, n*(Kt)) = M(n*(Kt)). Naturally, it could be that we reach nt while
still F(Kt, nt) > M(nt), and further entry is not possible because of this
technological restriction. Therefore, the equilibrium number of firms in
the economy is given by:
nt = min{n*(Kt),nJ
Implications
We can now discuss the implications of this simple model.
1. Increases in nt, which we can associate with the level of develop-
ment of the economy, lead to increasing risk-taking by firms. There-
fore, if fit is increasing over time, we should see greater risk-taking by
firms.
2. Equilibrium nt is not decreasing in Kt and nt, so both more resources
and technological progress will increase risk-taking by firms. There-
fore, this model suggests a secular (steady) pattern of increasing risk-
taking by firms.
3. It can also be shown that economy-wide Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) is also increasing in nt since as nt increases, more resources are
allocated to the higher productivity (risky) activities.212 Acemoglu
4. More important for the focus here, aggregate volatility is also a
function of nt. Let V(nt) = Var(ct) be the variance of consumption or
income. Thus:
• If y > R/(2R - r), then dV(nt)/dnt < 0 Vn,





< 0 Vnf > ri
> 0 Vn, < n'
This result implies that aggregate volatility could be at first increasing
in the extent of development but is eventually decreasing in nt. This is
because of increasing diversification (i.e., decreasing correlation be-
tween firms). Combined with implication 1 above this implies that, at
least after a certain stage, there will be a simultaneous increase in firm-
level volatility and a decline in aggregate volatility.
5. The model also has some immediate implications about financial
development. To develop these implications, suppose that there is
endogenous participation in this economy. In particular, a unit mea-
sure of consumers have capital k each, and an outside option COJ distrib-
uted according to some cumulative density function G. Moreover,
taking part in the stock market and investing in firms has a transaction
cost T. Let the maximized value of the above program be U(nt,Kt). If
a>i > U(nt,Kt) - T, then individual i does not participate in the stock
market and does not invest in firms. This implies that the equilibrium
amount of funds invested in firms will satisfy:
Kt = G(U(nhKt)-r)k
Inspection of this equation implies that multiple equilibria are possible
since greater Kt enables better diversification and increases the utility
of participation, leading to greater investments. More important is the
fact that when nt increases because of technological progress, this has
an amplified effect because it induces financial development (i.e., the
amount of resources to be invested in firms, Kt, increases). Conse-
quently, financial development induced by a decline in x leads to an in-
crease in firm-level volatility and a decline in aggregate volatility. This
highlights the fact that financial development could be associated with
increased risk taking by firms (and reduced aggregate volatility), even
though it is itself determined endogenously in equilibrium.Comment 213
In addition to the results and implications discussed here, there are a
number of other results that are useful to mention. First, in Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (1997), the equilibrium is not Pareto optimal (because of
the pecuniary externalities created by endogenous market incomplete-
ness). Second, this inefficiency disappears as nt —> I.
4
Finally, but also crucially, this model highlights another important
theoretical aspect: the internal organization of the firm matters. If two
firms merge, firm-level volatility will decline. Therefore, whether firm-
level volatility increases over the process of development depends on
whether expansion is undertaken by existing firms or by new firms
(extensive versus intensive margin). Consequently, theories of the rela-
tionship between the firm-level and aggregate volatility have to model
the internal organization and boundaries of firms. This seems to be an
important and interesting area for future research.
Rethinking the Evidence
Having worked through the model, we can now look at the facts
through the lenses of this theory. A number of results are apparent:
• According to this model, there should be a negative relationship be-
tween aggregate and firm-level volatility.
• There should also be a negative relationship between income per cap-
ita and aggregate volatility (and a positive relationship with the firm-
level volatility).
• There should be a steady increase in firm-level volatility and a steady
decline in aggregate volatility.
• The model highlights that the driving force can be technological or
related to financial development.
• Organization of firms and sectors matters for the relationship be-
tween aggregate and firm-level volatility.
Consequently, despite its simplicity, this existing model appears to be
consistent with the salient patterns emphasized by Comin and Philip-
pon.
5 This does not imply that it is the right explanation, and a more-
in-depth analysis might reveal that it has qualitative or quantitative
features that do not match the data. Nevertheless, it suggests that
theories that endogenize risk diversification and risk-taking provide
an interesting avenue for understanding the simultaneous decline in
aggregate volatility and increase in firm-level volatility. It also high-
lights the use of fully worked out models in thinking about these sets
of issues.214 Acemoglu
Conclusion
To conclude, the literature surveyed and the facts presented in this
paper are important for our thinking on many topics. They are rela-
tively convincing about an increase in firm-level volatility and that we
ought to think about the change in aggregate volatility differently. This
is an important achievement, but it will be useful only when we start
thinking more systematically about what types of models can be con-
sistent with these facts and what the implications are for aggregate
observables and welfare. One interesting issue, already mentioned
above, is to think more systematically about whether changes in the
boundaries of the firm interact in interesting ways with aggregate
volatility.
Endnotes
1. Such an exercise would be useful if, for example, one suspected that there was a rela-
tionship between age of firms and firm-level volatility.
2. This is not the same as an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, which would require all mar-
kets, even those in which there is zero transaction, to clear. Because of the endogeneity
of the commodity space, a weaker equilibrium concept is more appropriate here. This
will also be the reason why the decentralized equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto opti-
mal (see below and also Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997).
3. The allocation of the total investment in riskless activities, Jo (j>l dj, across firms, on the
other hand, is indeterminate since firm-level volatility does not matter for consumers.
4. We can also identify F\ with R&D-like activities. Therefore, this class of models would
be able to account for the correlation between R&D-type activities and sectoral volatility.
5. See Thesmar and Thoenig (2004) for a model along these lines applied to French data.
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Diego Comin and Thomas Philippon have written an intriguing paper
compiling evidence on the rise in firm-level volatility in the second half
of the twentieth century—despite a concurrent decrease in aggregate
volatility. This increase in idiosyncratic volatility is evident from many
angles: in both real and financial data, across firms and within a firm
over time, and across industries. Comin and Philippon parse the data
in other ways in order to better understand the source of increasing
volatility at the firm level. Before attempting to associate these facts
with a theory, however, my comments first focus on solidifying the ev-
idence. The angle I take on the data is largely supportive of the Comin
and Philippon findings, though it raises some questions. In particular,
it remains to be seen whether the increase in volatility, which was par-
ticularly pronounced in the 1990s, will persist into the new millen-
nium. The data raise some questions on this point, and the answers
help to delineate between different explanations. Most of the explana-
tions suggested in the paper and in the literature are consistent with a
trend or possibly a level increase in firm-level volatility, resulting from
an increase in competitiveness or financial development, for example.
However, the data suggest a possible reversal in the volatility trend. In
that case, we need to explain an episode, not a trend, which gives a dif-
ferent flavor to the proposed explanations.
My comments will begin with the financial data, and then turn to the
real data. The financial data give us a slightly different view of the firm
and the aggregates since they are available at high frequency and give
a measure of market value (rather than current sales). The standard ref-
erence in this literature is Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (Journal of
Finance, 2001, CLMX hereafter), who examine the equity values of pub-
licly traded firms from 1926 through 1997. Looking first at the aggre-
gate index, they find that "there is no discernible trend" (p. 9) in the218 Eberly
standard deviation of the value-weighted index returns over this time
period.
1 CLMX then decompose the aggregate index into market-
wide, industry, and firm-level risk. They find that all three are counter-
cyclical, so that volatility from all sources is higher during recessions.
However, the firm-level volatility data show a marked upward trend
(CLMX, figure 4), while the market and industry volatilities show no
clear, long-run trend (CLMX, figures 2 and 3).
The next angle taken by the literature and the authors is to step
away from the public market valuation of firms and directly examine
firms' performance—either sales or output. At the aggregate level, sev-
eral well-known papers have documented a striking decrease in the
volatility of aggregate gross domestic product (GDP). McConnell and
Perez-Quiroz (2000) and Stock and Watson (2002) both document the
declining volatility of aggregate GDP over the postwar period, which
McConnell and Perez-Quiroz identify as a structural break in 1984. To
check the robustness of these findings, I use data on final sales for 1947
to 2004 and find much the same pattern, as shown in figure 3.16. The
four-quarter standard deviation of growth in final sales is 2.1 percent
in the full sample, which represents a decline from 2.4 percent in the
first half of the sample to 1.7 percent in the second half. (Using 1984 as
the break point, the standard deviation of final sales falls from 2.4 per-
cent pre-1984 to 1.3 percent for 1984 and later.)
^ = z + ^ = >l + = = z
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The most obvious explanation for such a decline in aggregate volatil-
ity is a change in the composition of GDP—toward less volatile service
sectors. Indeed, the goods component of GDP has fallen from 80 per-
cent to 60 percent, while services have risen accordingly. A basic calcu-
lation suggests, however, that a simple change in composition is not
sufficient to explain the reduction in aggregate volatility. Using the vol-
atilities and covariance of goods and services for the full sample and
doubling the share of services reduces the aggregate standard devia-
tion by 12 percent, whereas in the data it falls by at least 30 to 40
percent, depending on the exact measure and break point. Thus, com-
position, or at least the split between goods and services, does not
seem sufficient to explain the reduction in aggregate volatility. Directly
examining the volatilities of goods and services separately reinforces
this view. Figure 3.17 plots the four-quarter standard deviations of
final sales of goods and final sales of sendees. Even within the goods
and services categories, there is a substantial decline in volatility. So if
composition is to be the explanation, there must be compositional
change within goods and within services as well.
2
This decline in aggregate volatility is in contrast to a trend of increas-
ing volatility at the firm level, which is the centerpiece of the paper.
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that the median volatility of firms has risen from a low of 7.5 percent in
1960 to about 20 percent in 2000. It is worth noting how this is mea-
sured. The authors calculate for each firm the growth rate of sales in
each year from the COMPUSTAT sample of publicly traded firms.
They then calculate a ten-year standard deviation of these growth
rates, centered on the current year; more precisely, they include four
leads, the concurrent value, and five lags. This gives the standard devi-
ation of sales for a firm in a given year. The authors then calculate the
median of this value across firms, and the result is plotted in figure 3.1,
while the other quartiles plotted in figure 3.2 show that the phenome-
non of rising volatility carries across the distribution of firms.
Again an obvious explanation for this observation is the composition
of the sample. The number of publicly traded firms has increased dra-
matically over time; Fama and French (2001) show that the number
of publicly traded non-financial non-utilities increased by a factor of
five from 1960 to 2000.
3 Moreover, the new entrants are measurably
different than the incumbents; in addition to being younger, they are
smaller, less likely to pay dividends, and on average less profitable.
Comin and Philippon recognize this difference in composition and con-
trol for age and size by regressing each firm's volatility measure on
log(age) and size, as well as industry dummies. The residuals show a
similar upward trend, as graphed in figure 3.3 of the paper. Using this
method to control for possible compositional effects requires that the
effects of age, size, and industry are constant over time and across
firms, and moreover that they capture the relevant heterogeneity.
Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu face a similar problem in their eq-
uity return data and instead control for compositional effects by creat-
ing a balanced panel of incumbent firms, which by construction has a
fixed composition.
4 They still find a convincing pattern of rising vola-
tility in this sample; it would be interesting to see if the same result
would obtain in the sales data from the COMPUSTAT firms.
The final angle from which to examine these data is the time series.
Any measure of volatility necessarily has time dimension, and Comin
and Philippon use a ten-year rolling window to calculate each firm's
standard deviation of sales growth. Their sample ends in 2004, so the
final year of their volatility measure is 2000. The effect of changing the
breadth of the window used for calculating volatility is nicely evident
in CLMX's figures, where they provide two panels, one graphing the
within-month firm volatility and the second graphing a twelve-month
moving average. To provide a similar comparison for firm-level salesComment 221
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Figure 3.18
Five-Year Centered Standard Deviation of Firm-Level Sales Growth, 1974-2002
growth volatility, I reproduced Comin and Philippon's distributions of
sales growth and then varied the window-length for computing the
standard deviation. First, using Comin and Philippon's ten-year win-
dow, I verify that my sample matches the 25th, 50th, and 75th percen-
tiles reported in figure 3.2 of the paper. In each case, it matches to
within one percentage point. Using a five-year window gives a very
similar picture, with the median-firm standard deviation rising from
12 percent to 20 percent from 1974 to 2000. However, narrowing the
window allows us to extend the sample, in the sense that the last year
for which we can estimate a standard deviation is now 2002 instead of
2000. This small adjustment in the calculation, however, can make a
large difference in the endpoint, as shown in figure 3.18. The estimated
median volatility in 2002 is only 14 percent, which is substantially low-
er than the 20 percent estimated for 2000 and only slightly higher than
the starting point of 12 percent. Figure 3.19 shows the results of using a
three-year window to calculate the standard deviation, which smooths
the data less but gives a clearer picture of what is happening near the
endpoints. In this figure, by 2003, each quartile of the standard devia-
tions returns to its beginning-of-sample value.
These calculations suggest the possibility that the greater volatility
evident in firm-level sales may be reversing itself. In particular, the ac-
celeration of volatility observed in the 1990s may have been tempo-
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Figure 3.19
Three-Year Centered Standard Deviation of Firm-Level Sales Growth
data are available at high frequency. The Chicago Board Options Ex-
change (CBOE) publishes implied volatilities on individual stocks, as
well as indexes. Figure 3.20 graphs the average and figure 3.21 graphs
the quartiles of individual firm volatilities since 2001. The average vol-
atility (standard deviation) has fallen from 88 percent to 30 percent,
while the median has fallen from 80 percent to 25 percent from March
2001 to December 2004.
5 The implied volatilities on the indexes have
also declined markedly, with the S&P 500 index volatility hovering be-
low 15 percent and the NASDAQ volatility below 20 percent—which
is one-half to one-third their levels in 2001 and 2002. This reduction in
volatility is not only a characteristic of implied volatilities on options, it
is also evident in realized volatilities. Figure 3.22 shows the realized
volatilities of several individual stock returns, demonstrating the rever-
sion of volatility to its levels of the early 1990s—following the turbu-
lence of the late 1990s and early 2000s.
While the late 1990s strike many intuitively as a turbulent period,
consistent with high firm-level volatility, there is also supporting statis-
tical evidence. The Small Business Administration reports net business
creation, as well as births and deaths, since 1989. Figure 3.23 shows the
rise in net firm creation in the early 1990s, but then a decline following
1995, which actually leveled off during the recession in 2001. This

















1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Year
Figure 3.22


































1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Year
Figure 3.24
SBA Firm Births and Deaths
late 1990s. Figure 3.24 shows that while firm deaths rose after 1995, the
number of firm births remained at high levels throughout the period.
While certainly not conclusive, this evidence is suggestive of high turn-
over in smaller (non-publicly-traded) firms.
This increase in volatility during the boom years of the late 1990s
stands out against an otherwise countercyclical pattern of volatility in
both the financial and real data. This episode also contributes notice-
ably to the appearance of a trend in volatility over time since the in-
crease in volatility not only continued but accelerated over this period
(figure 3.19, for example). Moreover, the most recent data suggests
that the turbulence of the 1990s may be reversing itself. Understanding
whether this period is an episode or the continuation of a volatility
trend may be an important first step to understanding and explaining
the interesting set of facts compiled in this paper.
Endnotes
1. Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu calculate the standard deviation of monthly returns
within a year to obtain the annual standard deviation of the value-weighted index of
NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX equity returns.
2. This could be the case since the service component of goods may be rising, as may the
service component of services.226 Eberly
3. Fama, Ev and K. French (2001), "Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteris-
tics or Lower Propensity to Pay?" Journal of Financial Economics, 60:3-43.
4. This is still not a perfect control for compositional change since the composition of
incumbents may change through mergers, acquisitions, and even new investments.
5. The CBOE reports annualized daily volatility.
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Participant comments focused on increased specialization, increases in
the number of firms, and compositional changes.
Xavier Gabaix emphasized the trend within firms toward de-
agglomeration and increased specialization. This slicing up of the
value chain, he argued, could also account for some of the increased
firm volatility. Robert Hall echoed this point of increased specialization
and connected it to outsourcing. Modern firms rely much more on
outsourcing—either internationally or within national borders. He
gave as examples Sara Lee's reliance on contract manufacturing sent
directly to supermarkets, and Microsoft's contract manufacturing
of the Xbox. In Hall's view, the increasing sophistication of the U.S.
economy—in particular, financial development—facilitated the con-
tractual relationships necessary for outsourcing and thus contributed
to the increase in specialization and the concomitant increase in firm
volatility. Thomas Philippon responded that there were in fact many
conglomerates started after 1980 that were broken into small pieces by
the 1990s. But he noted that increased volatility is also true for single-
segment firms in the COMPUSTAT database.
Robert Hall also contended that the different trends in aggregate and
firm-level volatility are compelled by the simple fact that there are
many more firms than there used to be. If the number of firms had
remained constant, and firms were just rescaled as we rescale the econ-
omy, then aggregate volatility would remain the same. But any in-
crease in the number of firms automatically means that the trend in
firm-level volatility is going to be rising relative to aggregate volatility.
If there had been no increase in firm-level volatility, there would have
been an even larger decline in aggregate volatility. Thomas Phillipon
agreed with this theory but noted that even when you hold the num-
ber of firms fixed, you see higher volatility at the firm level.228 Discussion
Regarding composition effects, Xavier Gabaix cautioned that
decreasing volatility in both the services and manufacturing sectors
does not mean that composition effects are any less important to the
declining aggregate volatility. If services are less volatile than manu-
facturing, and there is a change in composition toward more services,
then aggregate volatility will decrease. But if there is feedback from ag-
gregate volatility to sectoral volatility, then the decrease in aggregate
volatility will cause the volatility of both manufacturing and services
to decrease.
Diego Comin reported that by looking at the aggregate variance
decompositions using the KLEM data, the importance of compositional
change can be determined. When Comin and Philippon assumed
that the shares of sectors are constant, they found that adding up
the variance/covariance components gives a very close approxima-
tion of aggregate variance. They concluded from this that composi-
tional change is not a big part of the story of the decrease in aggregate
volatility.
Comin also reiterated that the variance decompositions show that
the important channel is not the variance within a sector but the
covariance between sectors. Particularly in the second wave of the
KLEM data (1958-1994), the variance component is an order of magni-
tude smaller than the covariance for the growth of value-added data.
Further, there is no evidence of a decline in the variance of sectoral
growth, but there is clear evidence of a decline in the correlation of
growth across sectors.
Finally, Justin Wolfers suggested using option price data to get an
indication of implied or expected volatility and investigating this at
the firm level. Thomas Philippon reported that using option-pricing
values implied firm-level volatility has come down. Credit spread can
also be used as a measure of credit risk, and the downward trend is
seen there as well.